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THE DETECTION AND RECOVERY OF CONTRABAND
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
JOHN N. O'BRIEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE THEFT of a nuclear weapon or of material capable of being fashioned
into an explosive device could have cataclysmic consequences for the
American public. Therefore, the various federal agencies responsible for
the security of nuclear weapons and materials have gone to great lengths
to forestall a successful theft. However unlikely, though, such an occurrence
remains possible.
The consequences of such an event may not be completely technical
in nature and, in fact, the largest impact may be in non-technical or "societal"
areas. It had been widely assumed before the incident at Three Mile Island
(TMI) that the consequences of a nuclear accident would be limited to
immediate deaths, somatic diseases, economic loss, and general destruction.'
The TMI incident showed that assumption to be patently false. Although
there has been a good deal of controversy about the extent of the incident's
technical consequences,' it is clear that the societal consequences were vast
and far-reaching. On an individual level, personal fear and stress, economic
loss, mistrust of authority, and loss of productivity certainly resulted. Media
confusion, alarmism, and civil disorder were collective societal consequences.
Institutional reactions included the reorganization of the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, cessation of power plant licensing proceedings, juris-
dictional confusion, and a variety of special investigations.' The nation was
clearly unprepared for consequences of these dimensions.
In an effort to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, the present ad-
ministration is committed to the exploitation of nuclear energy,' although
specifics of advanced nuclear energy systems have not been discussed in
*B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Syracuse University, Interdisciplinary Social Science; Associate Scientist,
Technical Support Organization, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Associated Universities,
Inc., Upton, New York. This article is adapted from a study prepared by the author
for the Office of Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
D.C.
1 See, e.g., REACTOR SAFETY STUDY, Wash.-1400, reissued as N.U. Reg. 75-014 at A-8 (Oct.
1975); SAFETY AND SECURrrY OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS TO ACTS OF SABOTAGE, Sand.
75-0504 at 8 (Jan. 1976).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, § 1, at 25, col. 5, 6; id., Apr. 8, 1979, § 1, at 28,
col. 2, 4.
3See Exec. Order No. 12,130, 3 C.F.R. 380 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 5848 (Supp.
III 1979). (This Executive Order was later revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,258, 46 F.R. 1251,
5 U.S.C.A. app. I, § 14 (Supp. 1981), because the work of the committee established by
the earlier order had been completed.)
4 See Reagan Budget Boosts Nuclear Spending: Reagan Aid Boosts its Prospects, NUCLEONICS
WEEK, March 21, 1981, at 1.
1
O'Brien: Contraband Nuclear Material
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
much detail. Several nuclear energy options, including the two most likely
- fast breeder reactors and recycling of plutonium - involve the use of
material capable of being fabricated into an explosive. This material will
be in the private sector, albeit licensed and heavily regulated, and con-
trolled by a safeguards system of nuclear material accounting and physical
security.
Nuclear material accounting involves systematic sampling and analysis
to verify that material supposed to be present is, in fact, in the possession
of the licensee. Physical security includes the use of barriers, sophisticated
surveillance techniques, and armed guard forces. Accounting serves to
detect theft by providing a "timely" indication that material is missing and
security provides a deterrent by creating multiple obstacles to a theft at-
tempt. The major emphasis of safeguards planning and policy making has
been on detection and deterrence, rather than on post-event strategy.
Nuclear activities in the United States fall basically into three categories.
One is nuclear weapons production, largely unknown to the public because
of the secrecy surrounding defense activities. There are also two publicly
regulated uses for nuclear materials - medical applications and energy
production. Nuclear medicine involves the use of short-lived radioactive
materials primarily as tracers in radiographic analysis. Nuclear materials
used in medical applications are, for the most part, not a significant threat
to the general public. However, nuclear energy production involves the
use of materials which can present a serious threat to public safety without
the shield of secrecy surrounding the weapons production program.
Nuclear energy is a matter of serious debate around the world.' Cur-
rently the production of electricity from nuclear materials is dominated by
the use of light-water-reactors (LWR) and low-enriched uranium (LEU)
fuel. LEU fuel cannot be used to make a nuclear explosive and its level of
radioactivity is extremely small. However, once LEU fuel is "burned" in
an LWR a portion of the uranium in the fuel is turned into plutonium.
United States utilities keep burned, or "spent" fuel in temporary storage.
Spent fuel is lethally radioactive. If plutonium is recovered from spent
fuel by remotely controlled chemical reprocessing it can be recycled as
reactor fuel. It can also be used to make a nuclear explosive. The chemical
reprocessing concept is exactly the same for both energy fuel recycling
and weapons production. Only the end use of the plutonium is different.
The present administration has also called for the development of a
commercial fast-breeder-reactor (FBR) . An FBR can be designed and
5 See, e.g., Questions Abound for French Nuclear Program with Mitterrand's Election,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 14, 1981, at 1; Derailed German Nuclear Program Inches Buck
Toward the Track, id., March 26, 1981, at 1.
5See Clinch River Breeder Dying in House, Alive in Senate, NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 21,
1981, at 3.
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operated to produce more fuel than it uses. This anomalous condition
actually results from putting a useless form of uranium into the reactor.
The nuclear reaction inside the reactor turns it into plutonium. An FBR
is designed to convert more uranium to plutonium than the plutonium it
burns up. This concept of using plutonium to produce electricity has been
phrased the "plutonium economy."
Plutonium is a man-made element with a radioactive half-life of
24,600 years. If configured correctly, it can produce massive amounts of
electricity or an explosion of multiple kiloton equivalents. It is highly
poisonous and is thus a threat to any population center in which it is dis-
persed. Other advanced nuclear energy systems currently under consider-
ation involve pure uranium-235, material used in at least one United States
nuclear explosive, and uranium-223, also capable of producing an explosion.
LEU fuel is almost entirely uranium-238, which cannot produce an ex-
plosion, but an LWR converts it to plutonium as it operates. Materials
capable of being fashioned into an explosive are called "fissile" materials.
The purpose of this article is to explore one particular societal con-
sequence which could result from a theft of plutonium, uranium-235, or
uranium-233 from energy production facilities. The potential legal impli-
cations of a plutonium economy will affect both constitutional and adminis-
trative law.
At present virtually all plutonium in the commercial sector is con-
tained in spent fuel at reactor sites and very little uranium-235 or -233 is
currently at any energy facilities. The Reagan administration and Congress
have signalled a favorable climate for advanced nuclear fuel systems which
will employ fissile materials. The feasibility of detection and subsequent re-
covery of nuclear fissile material illicitly removed from a facility is a question
which has rarely been addressed. This article will explore the adequacy of re-
mote detection and location devices designed to find contraband fissile nuclear
materials and will examine the legal consequences of going beyond remote de-
tection and location to actual searches for contraband. The TMI incident
made it clear that such societal consequences were not given sufficient at-
tention in the past and their relevance to the issue of whether to use a
plutonium economy is unquestionable.
II. THE CONCEPTS OF DETECTION
A. Looking for Nuclear Materials
All fissile nuclear material is radioactive and emits either gamma rays
or neutrons or both. These radioactive emissions may provide a means of
"observing" the presence of nuclear material with the aid of radiation de-
tectors. The detectors contemplated in this article are designed for sur-
veillance at controlled access points from an area containing fissile material
Summer, 1981l
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and for locating the material after it has been removed from the area
in an unauthorized fashion.
The specific types of fissile materials which are important in the nuclear
fuel cycle from a security standpoint are plutonium (Pu), uranium-233
(U23 ), and uranium-235 (U23 ).7 These are the fissile materials which
can be fashioned into nuclear fission explosive devices. All of these mate-
rials emit gamma and neutron radiation which can be observed by radi-
ation detectors with varying efficiencies. A brief discussion of the technical
characteristics of these materials will demonstrate the uncertainties involved.
A detector for fissile nuclear material is set up first to monitor the level of
radiation which is normal to the area being searched. It must be recognized
that gamma rays and neutrons are constantly passing through all terrestrial
environments and that detection involves looking for "extra" sources of
radiation. So a normal radiation measurement is made, and then samples
of an area to be searched are compared to normal levels. When an area
has significantly more radiation than it should, it is assumed that an extraneous
source, for example, contraband nuclear material, is producing the excess.
Fissile nuclear material can be "shielded," however, and made more
difficult to detect by placing a sufficient quantity of material resistant to the
passage of radiation around the it, thereby shielding it from detection.
Typically, lead may be used. The thickness of lead sufficient to shield fissile
materials from detection by blocking gamma radiation varies with the
type of material being hidden. U 33 has the least energy associated with its
gamma emissions and, as a result, a quarter inch of lead can reduce its
detectability via gamma rays by a factor of 1000. Pu is not as easily shielded
because of its higher-energy gamma emissions, but a one-inch thickness
of lead can reduce its gamma emissions by a factor of 100 or more. In the
case of U"", it is very difficult to shield gamma radiation because all U211
fuels also contain some U12 which decays to produce thallium-208 (T12 )
which, in turn, produces extremely high-energy, easily detectable gamma
radiation.'
An alternative to looking for gamma radiation is to look for neutron
emissions. Both Pu and U233 emit sufficient neutron radiation to be de-
tectable with radiation detectors. It is possible to shield neutron emissions
as well, but the best shielding material is "borated" plastic. Heavy metals,
such as lead, do not interdict neutrons, while low-density materials such
as plastics will slow down and capture most neutrons. Boron, an element
7 U 235 is considered fissile material only when it is in a concentration greater than 20%.
All references in this article to U2 85 will be to uranium enriched to a 20% or greater con-
centration.8 E. WEINSTOCK, THE SPInNo OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AS A SAFEIARDS MEASURE,
at H1-1 (BNL-TSO File No. 5.9.1, Sept. 19, 1975) (prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n).
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which readily absorbs neutrons, will capture the remainder if mixed with
a low-density medium like plastic and thus, borated plastic. This type of
shielding must be very thick and bulky, however, to be at all effective.'
B. Spiking Fissile Materials
Spiking is the adding of other radioactive materials to fissile materials
in order to enhance their detectability even through substantial shielding.
The two types of spikants under consideration are gamma-emitting and
neutron-emitting spikants. Each of these spikants will be examined briefly
in order to define the limits of their utility."0
1. Gamma-Ray Spikants
Three radioactive substances suggested as gamma spikants are thorium-
228 (Th2"), cobalt-60 (Coll), and yttrium-88 (y" 5)." Th.228 does not, in
itself, increase gamma emissions when added to fissile materials but one of its
daughter products, T12°8, produces very powerful gamma radiation. However,
several days must elapse after purification before enough TF1° is produced
from Th221 to be effectively detected. A disadvantage is that Th
22
1 decay
produces harmful alpha radiation which may raise health-physics con-
siderations among workers at nuclear facilities. While high levels of alpha
radiation may be dangerous, they add little to a material's detectability.
Co90 gamma radiation is somewhat less powerful than that produced by
Thus decay, but its longer half-life is more convenient and it is more readily
available than Th228.
The gamma radiation emitted by Y1 is more powerful than that by
Co °, but its half-life is very short by comparison and it is undetectable
after about 100 days.
If U2 32 were added to U2 5 fuels, it would decay to produce Th
2  
.
U 2 1 is virtually impossible to separate from U2 35 so that it would constitute
an unremovable "fingerprint." U231, however, suffers the same disadvantage as
Th2 2 '. An even greater time must pass, on the order of weeks or months,
for sufficient decay to produce enough T.0 to be reliably detected by radi-
ation detectors. It should be noted that any aged U 2" materials will con-
tain enough U23 2 to be detected even through substantial shielding.
In the process stream, Th -2 28 may create problems because it is more
toxic than the other candidate spikants. This toxicity is due to high alpha
emission rates, but since it would add by only about a third to the existing
9Id. at 11-21.
'
0 An added problem with spiking is its clear disregard for the As-Low-As-Reasonably-
Achievable (ALARA) standard of minimizing employees' exposure to excessive radiation
risks. Whether spiking would create an excessive risk is a policy question.
11 See INT'L RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY CORP., MODIFICATION OF STRATEGIC SPECIAL Nu-
CLEAR MATERIALS TO DETER THm THEFT OR UNAUTHORIZED USE, (IRT-378-R, Nov. 6,
1975) (prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n).
Slimmer, 1981]
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alpha radiation from U-235 and a negligible amount to that of Pu, toxicity
may constitute only a minor problem. In process, a more serious concern
is that purification may remove T12 8 and it would take at least ten days
to reestablish a sufficient concentration for detectability. Co ° may evaporate
in process, making it difficult to manage. The behavior of Y11 in the
process stream is not known.1"
2. Neutron Spikants
Spiking fissile materials with neutron spikants has two major ad-
vantages over gamma-ray spikants: neutron shielding is very bulky and,
therefore, more conspicuous than gamma-ray shielding, and moderated
thermal neutrons (i.e., slowed-down neutrons) are easier to detect against
normal background radiation levels than gamma rays."
Pu emits such large quantities of neutrons spontaneously that addition of
a spikant to produce nuerton emissions would be superfluous. U15, however,
does not produce such a neutron emission so that it may be logical to
add a neutron spikant if it is used in a nuclear energy fuel cycle. U 3 fuels
produce a level of gamma radiation sufficient to negate any need for con-
sideration of neutron spiking or observation."
The most promising neutron spikant is californium-252 (Cf 52 ). The
addition of Cf... to U'35 fuels would increase the total reactivity of U2 5
by 0.1% and it would significantly increase the detectability of neutron
emissions.15
III. SPIKING FOR DETECTION AT DOORWAY MONITORS
A. Regulatory Requirements
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires that facilities
possessing significant quantities of fissile materials"0 provide physical pro-
tection measures in addition to those required for other fixed site facilities."7
In that set of requirements, the NRC provides that:
Each individual, package, and vehicle shall be searched for con-
cealed special nuclear material [fissile materials] before exiting from
a material access area unless exit is into a contiguous material access
area. The search may be carried out by a physical search or by use of
12 WEINSTOCK, supra note 8, at I-5.
18 Id. at 11-22.
14 R. AUGUSTON & T. REILLY, FUNDAMENTALS OF PASSIVE NONDESTRUCTIVE ASSAY OF FIS-
SIONABLE MATERIAL 4 (LA-5651-M, Sept. 1974).
15 WENrSTOCK, supra note 8, at 11-5.
16 10 C.F.R. § 73.60 (1980) defines "significant quantities" as "uranium-235 (contained in
uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium
alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the
formula, grams - (grams contained in U-235) + 2.5(grams U-233 + grams plutonium)."
17 General requirements for physical security at fixed sites not possessing significant quan-
tities of fissile material are contained in 10 C.F.R. §§ 73.40, 73.50 (1980).
[Vol. 15:1
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equipment capable of detecting the presence of concealed special nu-
clear material."s
The regulations require further that:
Each licensee shall test and maintain intrusion alarms, physical bar-
riers, and other devices utilized pursuant to the requirements of this
section as follows:
(1) Intrusion alarms, physical barriers, and other devices used for
material protection shall be maintained in operable condition.
(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be inspected and tested for operability
and required functional performance at the beginning and end
of each interval during which it is used for material protection, but
not less frequently than once every seven (7) days.'9
The NRC regulatory guides0 provide guidance for licensees in meet-
ing these requirements. Regulatory guides are suggestions from the NRC
on how to meet regulatory requirements. They are not binding on either the
NRC or its licensees.
In essence, a doorway monitor must be able to detect at least 0.5 g of
Pu, 1.0 g of U23 , or 3.0 g of U2 ' shielded by at least 3 mm of brass. These
sensitivities are not difficult to achieve as long as the shielding used is not
greater than the specified amount. However, the use of thicker shielding or
of material more effective in shielding than brass may greatly reduce the
sensitivity of currently used doorway monitors, which, for the most part,
are designed to detect gamma radiation, not neutron emissions.
To put those parameters in perspective, Willrich and Taylor in
their seminal book on nuclear theft calculated that a reasonably sophis-
ticated explosive mechanism would need approximately eight kilograms of
Pu, 25 kg of U23 , or ten kg of U 3'." The cruder the explosive device used,
the more of each of these fissile materials would be necessary to create
an explosion.
Another fact worth noting is that the ability to design a sophisticated
device is very different from the ability to construct it. To make an analogy,
the design of an internal combustion engine is very easy to obtain but build-
ing it would require knowledge of engineering, metallurgy, and machining.
For most people, a home version would not run very long, if at all. Actu-
ally, construction of a nuclear explosive, even with sufficient fissile materials,
is a substantial undertaking which, much like the homemade internal com-
is 10 C.F.R. § 73.60(b) (1980) (emphasis added). "Special nuclear material" (SNM) is the
term used by regulatory agencies to designate significant quantities of fissile nuclear materials
capable of producing an explosion.
19 10 C.F.R. § 73.60(d) (1980).
20 See U.S.N.R.C. Reg. Guide 5.27 (1974).
21 M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR TlHEFT: RISKS A$p SAFEOUARDS, 12, 16, 18 (1974),
Summer, 1981]
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bustion engine, may not work. Still, the potential effects are devastating
enough to warrant a very conservative assumption about the ability of nu-
clear thieves to construct an explosive device with their stolen material.
B. Effects of Shielding Against Doorway Monitors
Experiments have been performed to examine the effects of shielding
certain amounts of fissile materials for covert removal through a doorway
monitor. Assuming the use of gamma-ray detectors and a threshold alarm
rate four standard deviations above background gamma radiation,"2 a set
of values can be arrived at for concentrations of various spikants which
render a given mass of fissile material detectable.
Because U233 materials will always contain enough U2 2 - to generate
Th 2 8, they will (after several days) emit sufficiently strong gamma radi-
ation to make shielding ineffective. Therefore, U2 3 materials are consid-
ered to be naturally "spiked" and their self-generated gamma radiation is
adequate for detection. Given a maximum permissible employee dose rate
of 2.5 mR/hr. at one foot, a 10 g sample of U-235 spiked with Th --
would be just detectable through a maximum of approximately 1 inch of
lead.
The physical dimensions of shielding create an upper limit for some-
one concealing it on his person. It is unlikely that a person could carry a
shield three inches thick without detection by an observer. Shielding may
be more difficult for neutron spikants since, as discussed earlier, neutron
shielding is very bulky and, therefore, more conspicuous than gamma-ray
shielding. Plutonium already emits copious amounts of neutrons without
any spikant while U235 does not. Thus U 3 would be a more logical candi-
date for neutron spiking than Pu.
The high background level of neutrons at facilities processing fissile
materials is a major problem in neutron detection. A background level
ten times that of Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, New York,
approximates that of a bulk handling facility for fissile materials. 3
Data indicate that Pu is already adequately "spiked" with its own
neutron emitters since less than 100 g of Pu can be detected through six
inches of shielding by a neutron detector. U... could be spiked with relatively
small quantities of Cf-252 to give comparable protection.
The shielding material used in collecting these data was polyethylene.
Other shielding materials and configurations may possess somewhat different
shielding characteristics, but a basic problem in neutron shielding is that
neutrons must be slowed down (moderated) in order to be efficiently
22 Background gamma radiation varies greatly according to the environment. In a nuclear
materials processing facility it might be well above normal levels.
23 This assumption has not been tested or verified.
[Vol. 15:1
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captured. Polyethylene moderates and captures neutrons, but the use of
two materials, one for moderation and one for capture, may increase
shielding effectiveness. Once again, the size of the shielding configuration
limits concealment so that a more efficient shield than polyethylene is im-
practicably large.
C. Administration and Legal Restrictions
Normal day-to-day operations call for the use of techniques which
amount to a search of all entering and exiting personnel and visual sur-
veillance of personnel while in the facility. The NRC regulatory guides
suggest that:
Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of hands-on
search ("frisking"), or by means of devices which will detect the pres-
ence of weapons and explosives or SNM [fissile nuclear materials] con-
cealed on the individual, or by a combination of both. The search
should be conducted in a manner which (1) provides assurance that
firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are not being carried
into the protected area and that SNM is not being transported into a
material access area and (2) minimizes inconvenience to the individuals
being searched. The use of equipment capable of detecting weapons,
explosives, or SNM is usually the preferable form of searching, since
the use of detection devices avoids the personal imposition of hands-on
search.2
The clear preference for avoiding the personal imposition of a physical
search is most likely a response to judicial concerns that the least onerous
means be used to assure that an individual is not violating access controls.
The guide goes on to suggest "airport-type" weapons detectors, in addition
to devices to monitor the presence of fissile materials.25
The practice of searching individuals who desire, for one reason or
another, entrance to a restricted area is not without precedent. It has been
widely used to prevent aircraft hijackings2 and courthouse violence .2 Both
airport boarding searches and courthouse briefcase inspections have been
extensively litigated and found to be reasonable, warrantless searches under
the fourth amendment."' The activities suggested by the NRC regulatory
guides are somewhat analogous to measures previously litigated and will be
examined in that light.
Access controls may include the use of "hands-off" personnel search
devices, inspection of packages, use of change rooms, visual surveillance,
24 U.S.N.R.C. Reg. Guide 5.7B (1974).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974).
27See, e.g., Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
914 (1972).
28 Id.
Summer, 19811
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patdown body searches (frisking), and strip searches including body cavity
searches.29 Only "hands-off" searches and inspection of packages are ad-
dressed in this article. In addition, some considerations will be given to
on-site response to a verified loss or theft.
1. "Hands-Off" Personnel Search Devices
The courts have dealt variously with constitutional issues arising from
the use of a magnetometer, a device which can detect concealed weapons
in airports, but the use of this type of device has been universally upheld
as an "absolutely minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger's privacy
weighed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hijacker is able
to proceed to the plane undetected.""°
Courts have justified airport detection devices with statements that
a "plane may become a weapon of mass destruction that no ordinary
person would have any way of obtaining except through a hijacking.'
The analogy to fissile material which is, in effect, a "weapon of mass de-
struction" which no ordinary person would have any way of obtaining
except through theft is a strong one.
The courts have found the use of magnetometers an "absolutely mini-
mal invasion of privacy" in which, "There is no detention at all; there is
no probing into an individual's private life and thoughts."3 However, a mag-
netometer may not be used surreptitiously because the courts have insisted
upon advance notice to passengers in all cases involving airport searches.
The NRC regulatory guides provide for "posting of a sign in a conspicuous
location . . . to . . . inform individuals requesting access into the pro-
tected area that they will be searched, and that any packages, etc., they wish
to take into the protected area will also be searched.""33 While the use of a
warning sign is not contemplated as a tool for obtaining "consent," it does
serve to negate any expectation of privacy that an individual may harbor.
The use of a magnetometer is not unlike the use of any electronic search
device, including explosive detectors and fissile material detectors. The ele-
ments of the search are subject to essentially the same constitutional limitations
regardless of the type of contraband the detection device is directed toward.
Since the use of magnetometers at airports affecting millions of travelers
every year has been upheld, there is little reason to suppose that courts
would not allow the use of electrical remote detection devices to extend into
29 See Dky, Civil Liberties Implications of a Safeguards Program for Special Nuclear Material
in the Private Nuclear Power Industry, 12 (1975) (prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n).
30United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
s Id. at 805.
32 Id. at 806. (citations omitted).
33U.S.N.R.C. Reg. Guide 5.7B-2 (1974).
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the far more limited area of safeguarding nuclear facilities possessing fissile
material with no fundamental change in present case law.
2. Inspection of Packages
The NRC regulatory guides state that:
No individual should be allowed to directly carry any package, valise,
tool box, or similar hand-carryable item into the protected area or out
of a material access area. Such objects should be handed to an attend-
ant, guard or watchman who will check them and pass them into the
protected area or out of the material access area.3"
This type of activity has been upheld in the same context as the use
of a magnetometer. In fact, detection devices may be used to screen parcels
after inspection for shielding.
The courts have considered the search of carry-on luggage in the air-
port situation a reasonable search. "A pre-boarding screening of all passen-
gers and carry-on articles sufficient in scope to detect the presence of
weapons or explosives is reasonably necessary to meet the need.""5
In the context of inspections of packages carried into a courthouse,
the need to protect government personnel and property from destruction
has been found sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the search.
"When the interest in protection of government property and personnel
from destruction is balanced against any invasion to the entrant's personal
dignity, privacy, and constitutional rights, the government's substantial
interest in conducting the cursory inspection outweighs the personal in-
convenience suffered by the individual." 6 The intent of the search is also
considered germane to its reasonableness:
[T]he persons whose packages are inspected generally fall within a
morally neutral class. Because everyone carrying the enumerated par-
cels is required to have them inspected, the inspection is not accusatory
in nature and the degree of insult to the entrant's dignity is minimal.
Thus it cannot be said that a finger of suspicion is unfairly or ar-
bitrarily being pointed at an individual as falling within a "highly se-
lective or inherently suspect" group."
There is little reason to believe that the courts would view as unrea-
sonable the inspection of packages and parcels in the much more limited
context of facilities containing fissile nuclear materials, when these techniques
have been upheld in airport and courthouse contexts.
3. Response to Emergency
The NRC regulatory guides stipulate simply that in the event of an
3' Id.
85 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973).
36 Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. at 274.
37 Id. (citations omitted).
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emergency "all individuals should be searched for concealed SNM [fissile]
material before being released from the protected area or collection area."s
No other stance is taken by the NRC concerning the scope of the search,
which could encompass anything from the use of a electrical detector to
a strip search and body cavity examination. Nowhere in the regulations or
guides is interrogation mentioned as a response to a shortage or theft. It
has been suggested in the literature that substantial pressure for detention,
search, and interrogation of employees may lead to such activities if a sud-
den shortage is recognized. 9 The scope of this article is limited to the use
of electrical, remote devices and, as such, most of these concerns are not
addressed here. There is clearly a need for guidance from the NRC on
this problem, however.
D. Conclusions
Where an authorized person diverts fissile nuclear material, it must
be assumed, for the sake of being conservative, that the diversion will oc-
cur incrementally over a period of time. An authorized individual may, for
example, take a small quantity of fissile material out of a process stream,
place it in a prefabricated shielded container, and smuggle the container past
a doorway monitor. Over a period of time a sufficient quantity of fissile
material could be accumulated outside the facility to fashion a crude ex-
plosive. The type and quantity of material diverted depends on the facility
in question. The better the quality of material accountancy, the smaller
the maximum quantity incrementally diverted must be to go unnoticed
by material accountants.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) which contains sufficient uranium-
235 to be fissile would be present at some enrichment facilities and in fuel
nuclear cycles utilizing HEU fuels. Plutonium would be present in chemical
reprocessing facilities, plutonium recycle fuel facilities, and fast breeder
reactors. U2"3 may be present in reprocessing facilities associated with thori-
um-based nuclear fuel cycles and subsequently in reactor fuel.
The threshold for judging a material to be "detectable" in this dis-
cussion is reached when sufficient shielding would be too large to conceal
from a doorway observer.
Highly enriched uranium, defined as uranium with greater than 20%
U21, is virtually impossible to detect in small quantities by gamma-emission
observation. One-quarter-inch thickness of lead can effectively shield a few
hundred grams of HEU, although the shielding would be very heavy. One
half inch of lead shielding would allow a multi-kilogram quantity of U 3
to be successfully smuggled past a doorway monitor.
This phenomenon suggests that HEU may be a good candidate for the
U.S.N.R.C. Reg. Guide 5.7-4 (1974).
39 Dyk, supra note 29, at 29.
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gamma-ray spikants suggested (Th, Coll, and Y88) to increase its de-
tectability. The higher energy of Th28 appears to make it the most attractive
except that its half-life is short (approximately 2 years). If that time period
corresponds with the maximum residence of the material at the facility in
question then spiking with Th"8 may be desirable. Coll has a longer, and
therefore more convenient, half-life (approximately 5 years), but its lower
emission energy would necessitate a larger quantity of spikant. Y"8 combines
a short half-life (approximately 0.3 years) and low energy, making it un-
satisfactory.
It may be more desirable to spike I-EU with a neutron-emitting
spikant. HEU does spontaneously emit neutrons, but at a rate too low
to reliably detect. The addition of Cf52 to HEU would make it observable
in a portal situation even through bulky shielding and would add to its
radioactivity (and, therefore, health-physics problems) by only 0.1%.
A problem with this approach, however, is that most doorway monitors
currently in use are set up to detect only gamma emissions. In any event,
unspiked HEU can be smuggled past most current doorway monitors
with only moderate difficulty.
U23 3 fuels which have aged several days since purification emit very
strong gamma radiation. The thickness of shielding necessary to render
even gram quantities of U233 undetectable would be far too large to conceal
and would certainly be noticed by the security guard stationed at the
doorway.
Plutonium in a nuclear fuel cycle can have various emission charac-
teristics depending on the bum-up of the fuel while in the reactor. How-
ever it can be calculated that a one-inch lead shield could allow 50 to 100
grams of Pu to escape detection by a gamma emissions detector. This sug-
gests that gamma-ray spikants may be desirable. As in the case of HEU,
Pu can be spiked with Th 28 to render it more detectable.
For neutron detection, no spikant is necessary. Pu emits copious neutron
radiation which is very difficult to shield at a close, controlled range. A
100 g quantity of Pu could be detected in a doorway situation even through
six inches of neutron shielding. It is not credible to assume that six inches
of shielding (at minimum, a 12-inch sphere) would be sufficiently incon-
spicuous to escape observation at the portal. As in the case of IEU, cur-
rent doorway monitors are designed, for the most part, as only gamma
emission detectors and unspiked plutonium could be smuggled past most
doorway monitors with moderate gamma shielding.
IV. LOCATING CONTRABAND NUCLEAR MATERIALS
A. Methods of Detection
Detection of radioactive emissions in a search outside the facility
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boundaries is significantly different from doorway detection. Various factors
such as changing background radiation, increased source-to-detector dis-
tances, and potential lack of control over count radiation rates contribute
substantially to greater difficulty in locating nuclear materials. It is difficult
to place realistic boundaries on the dimensions of an area search for contra-
band fissile materials. The following discussion of possible methods of locat-
ing radioactive emissions will be followed by an analysis of search scenarios
in order to examine the legal and administrative implications of such
searches.
1. Searching for Gamma Radiation
Several factors contribute to the difficulty of locating contraband fissile
materials by observing gamma radiation."0 These include: 1) the energy of
the emission; 2) the self-shielding of the fissile material; 3) the attenuation
of the emission by distance, air, or other intervening materials; 4) the
background gamma-radiation levels; 5) the characteristics of the equip-
ment available; and 6) the time intervals used in searching. These factors
are examined in the following sections.
a. Self-Shielding and Emission Energy
Nuclear material will absorb some radiation emitted by itself so that
while nuclear reactions which produce gamma rays will be occurring, some
of those gamma emissions will never leave the mass of fissile material in
question. This phenomenon is referred to as "self-shielding." Shelf-shielding
can be very significant in affecting the emissions of Pu, actually absorbing
most emissions generated in its mass.'
b. Attenuation of Gamma Radiation
Contraband fissile material will probably be secreted so as to minimize
the probability of detection, either visually or with radiation detectors. It
must be recognized that just air between a radiation source and a detector
will by itself attenuate gamma radiation significantly. As other materials
intervene, shielding effects increase dramatically. When the source is be-
hind 100 cm of concrete, emissions decrease by several orders of magnitude
and are commensurately difficult to detect. 2
c. Background Radiation
In order to alert an observer to the presence of nuclear material, the
radioactive source must have an emission sufficiently large to be detectable
above normal- background radiation. The principal sources of background
40 WEINSTOCK, supra note 8, at M1-3.
"See T. ROCKWELL, REACTOR SHIELDING DESIGN MANUAL (U.S. AEC Report No. TID-
7004, 1956).
42 See, e.g., Profio & Huth, Remote Sensing of Plutonium by the Law Energy Scattered Flux,
26 NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 340, '351 (1975); E. BuzARD, 3(B) REACTOR HANDBOOK (1962).
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gamma radiation are radioactive minerals in the ground, radioactive materials
in the air, and cosmic radiation from outer space. A major problem in any
search scenario is that background radiation levels often change substantially
from one location to another. In general, the higher the background level the
more difficult detection becomes.
d. Detector Efficiency
The type of detector dictates actual efficiencies. In general, the effi-
ciency of detection decreases as higher energy emissions are sought."3
Exact efficiencies of detectors likely to be used in a search for contraband
nuclear materials are classified as national security information and are
withheld from the public.
e. Time Intervals and Search Conditions
An effective search for radioactive sources requires that the time
interval for observation at a particular site be of sufficient duration to collect
enough emission counts to allow a reliable statistical analysis. The longer
the duration, the more accurate the detection system. If an airborne de-
tection system were used, time intervals would necessarily be very short
and the results far less reliable. If normal ground transportation is used
(e.g., a van or an automobile) longer intervals are possible and, therefore,
greater reliability.
The objective of the detection system is to identify gamma radiation
sufficiently greater than the previous background counts to indicate the
existence of some extraneous source. Here, we assume that the previously
collected counts contain only background radiation. The smaller the stand-
ard deviation of the background counts (i.e., among sample intervals) the
less extraneous gamma radiation is necessary for detection. In practice,
standard deviations in background when measured from a moving vehicle
may be very high, hence reducing the probability of detection. If only air
intervenes between the source and detector the energy of the gamma source
is not very important. However, as shielding is introducd high-energy gamma
radiation has advantages over lower energies.
Establishing radiation background levels for many areas of the United
States has been accomplished by "photographing" large land areas with
equipment capable of seeing radioactivity. If a theft occurred, new pictures
could be taken and new radiation sources checked out. The extent and
current accuracy of these picture files is not clear, but they represent a
reasonable way to overcome, to some extent, the problem of time intervals.
f. Potential Gamma-Source Spikants
The literature has suggested four gamma radiation sources as potential
48 See, e.g., S. VEGORS, CALCULATED EFFICIENCIES.. OF CYLINDRICAL RAD ATION DPTmcTo s
(IMO No. 16370, 1958).
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spikants for location of contraband fissile materials: cobalt-60, yttrium-88,
cesium- 137, and thorium-228."
The higher the radioactivity of the spikant, the less of it is necessary
for detection purposes. Higher energy emissions are desirable from the stand-
point of defeating shielding, and the half-life must be taken into account since
the passage of time will degrade detectability at a specific rate.
Y1S has the highest radioactivity but its half-life is relatively short
(approximately 108 days). Co10 has a low radioactivity and low emission
energies and a medium (approximately 5.3 years) half-life. Cs13 has a long
half-life (approximately 30 years) but a low energy emission and low radio-
activity. Th228 has a high radioactivity and a high energy emission, but a
short half-life (approximately 1.9 years).
It is apparent that Y88 is desirable over a short term because of its
high radioactivity, but its activity decreases quickly as time passes. Cs 37
may have the best potential as a spikant, but its low radioactivity and
emission energy require the use of very large quantities. Co ° has a reason-
ably long half-life for purposes of spiking, but its low emission energy
dictates that relatively large quantities of this spikant would also be neces-
sary. Th 8 has a relatively short half-life (about seven times greater than
Y88), but its high radioactivity and much higher emission energy make
it attractive as a potential spikant."5
2. Neutrons
The detection of neutrons is similar to the detection of gamma radi-
ation, with a few specific exceptions. The source strength of neutrons is
not as important, and self-shielding is not significant. Attenuation of neu-
trons in air is more appreciable than that of gamma radiation. 6
a. Attenuation of Neutrons
Neutrons emitted from radioactive material have an extremely high
velocity. The oxygen and nitrogen molecules in air are quite effective at
slowing down these fast neutrons. However, neutrons may travel a long
distance (approximately 1 km) in air before becoming thermalized (slowed
down). A slow neutron is captured, or absorbed, quickly by nitrogen in the
air. If neutron emissions travel about 100 to 300 meters in air most neutrons
will still be fast although their energies will be significantly altered.
Calculation of the attenuation of neutrons by concrete is difficult
because of the variations in composition. 100 cm of "average" concrete
4WEiNSTOCK, supra note 8, at 111-13-17.
46 Thorium-228 is. not in itself a spikant, but its daughter product, thallium-208, produces
high energy emissions once. in equilibrium.
46 WI NSTOCK, supra note 8, at M1-17-22.
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will generally attenuate a neutron flux by about an order of magnitude.
This value is approximate, but indicates that concrete can be used effectively
to shield neutrons from detection by remote radiation detectors.
b. Neutron Detection Systems
Neutron detection systems look for slow neutrons. Since neutron emis-
sions at their source are fast, some medium must be used at the detector
site to moderate (slow down) fast neutrons. Generally, as discussed be-
fore, this is accomplished with polyethylene which surrounds the actual
detection medium. A typical detection medium is boron triflouride (BF,)
which will produce, when a neutron enters the device, a measurable electric
charge in the medium. Neutron detection systems, therefore, will typically
observe neutrons by first slowing them down with polyethylene and then by
capturing them in a BF 3 medium. A detection system will be set to
identify a neutron count rate several times (e.g., four) above the standard
deviation for successive background counts.
c. Background Radiation
In general, the count rate of background neutron radiation is very
small when compared to gamma radiation. This phenomenon results in a
smaller standard deviation for neutron counts than for gamma radiation and,
therefore, more accurate measurements.
d. Potential Neutron-Source Spikants
The two neutron spikants suggested in the literature are curium-244
and californium-252. Both elements have high neutron emissions, but their
half-lives differ significantly (17.6 and 2.65 years, respectively).
3. Methods and Reliability
Fissile material, stolen and secreted so as to avoid detection, would be
shielded and hidden from sight. If gamma radiation detection were used
as a means of recovery, distance would prove an unsurmountable barrier
to searching a large area expeditiously. Variations in background counts
coupled with scenarios involving intervening distance or materials would
make detection of moderately shielded fissile material difficult, even if
the material were spiked. A search scenario must include an assumption
that some shielding would be attempted, making distance and count-rate
intervals the only conditions capable of adjustment. Therefore, in scenarios
including buildings and general congestion (e.g., in an urban environment)
it would be possible to locate contraband fissile material only by minimizing
distances. It can be expected, therefore, that some invasion of privacy would
necessarily occur during a search for contraband fissile materials.
Neutrons can be shielded quite easily when concealment on one's per-
son is not a factor. Several feet of water (e.g., a swimming pool) would
conceal neutron radiation from detectors. Detectors aimed at observing
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excessive neutron radiation would benefit as does gamma ray detection from
reduced source-to-detector distances. Either method, therefore, would re-
quire, as the exigency increases, greater invasions of privacy.
B. Legal Requirements and Restrictions
1. Jurisdiction and Background
Since the Federal Bureau of Investigation has jurisdiction over all
incidents, including nuclear threats, which involve suspected or actual
violations of federal laws, it would have primary jurisdiction and respon-
sibility for directing and coordinating federal operations in the event of
hostile actions against nuclear facilities or material and for the recovery
of fissile nuclear material. "7 If required, the DOE would support the FBI
by providing Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) responsible for
locating and identifying radiation-producing materials. The DOE and the
Department of Defense (DOD) would work together in many ways, in-
cluding the DOE/DOD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center,
which exchanges and maintains information about radiological assistance
capabilities and coordinates assistance in incidents involving radioactive
materials.
Personnel supporting the recovery plans are organized into NEST
teams and include representatives from the DOE laboratories and con-
tractors. Each of these agencies has developed a detailed plan for sup-
porting the teams with ground and airborne detection equipment, with
logistic and communications support, and with reinforcement by repre-
sentatives of the FBI and local law enforcement agencies. In addition to
the NEST teams, a wide variety of technical specialists is also available to
support an immediate recovery operation.
The foremost problem in recovery activities may be the interference with
civil liberties involved in a frantic search for material, which is known
only to be in a non-particular area (i.e., a certain city block or even a city
itself). Integral to the entire recovery issue is a decision as to which
sort of legal authority (and, therefore, legal procedure) should govern the
recovery operations. Recovery operations could fall under any of three
general sources of authority: national security, ordinary crime, and emer-
gency. Each authority carries its own restraints and freedoms in its re-
sponse to criminal activity. It is questionable whether recovery activities
could be classified as protecting health-unless the material is believed
to be missing because of an innocent mistake. The literature does not sug-
gest that innocent mistakes are to be assumed, however, in view of the
potential consequences of a successful theft.4"
4 7 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2251 (Supp. II 1978).
48See generally Dyk, supra note 29; J. BARTON, INTENSIriED" NtCLEAJR SAFGUARDS ANt CIM
Lmir~is (N.R.C. Contract No. AT-49-24-0190, 1975).
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Regardless of the authority assumed for recovery operations, it is
difficult to imagine a wide-scale search operation which would not result
in a general suppression of some constitutional rights. The right most likely
to be violated is freedom from unreasonable search and seizure with neither
warrants nor due process. Two other areas of concern can be raised: a
voluntary or involuntary media "blackout" of the recovery operation, and the
possibilities of martial law and potential evacuations. These considerations
lie outside the scope of this article, but must be weighed in any final analysis.
The sources of authority (i.e., national security, ordinary crime, and
emergency) must be examined separately, because the outcome of judicial
review of recovery activities may depend on which source of authority was
initially invoked.
2. Sources of Authority
a. National Security
The elements of national security require that a warrant be obtained
for a search unless the thief is an agent of or acting in collaboration with
a foreign power. The thrust of court decisions in this area is that a foreign
agent's dwelling may be entered or his telephone tapped without the for-
mality of a warrant. 9
If a recovery operation is provoked by concern that another nation
is actually attempting to subvert the United States government, then drastic
measures would be justified under clearly established constitutional doc-
trines. The most widely noted statement by the Supreme Court upholding
broad administrative powers in a national emergency is the decision sup-
porting the detention of Japanese-Americans during World War 11.50 Dur-
ing that period, the commanding general of the western command, United
States Army, directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry be excluded
from a "military area." This area encompassed the home of the petitioner,
a Japanese-American who had knowingly violated the order. The Supreme
Court stated that:
[W]e are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of
Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry
from the West Coast war area at the time they did. True, exclusion
from the area in which one's home is located is a far greater de-
privation than constant confinement to the home from 8 p.m. to 6
a.m. Nothing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities
of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally
justify either."
Two important facts are worth noting here, however. First, the action
49Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 944 (1975).
' Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
"Id. at 217-18.
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was taken pursuant to a declared state of war. An act of Congress had
authorized the President to promulgate exclusion orders and curfews during
the crisis. 2 On the basis of an executive order, several military orders,
such as those noted above, were held to be justifiable intrusions upon civil
liberties.53 In the event of a recovery operation, it is not clear that execu-
tive measures such as relocation of populations would be sustained in the
absence of a congressional mandate, even if foreign involvement were a
factor.
Secondly, the decisions upholding relocation of Japanese-Americans
have been widely criticized. It is possible that in a similar situation today
the courts and society in general would be more sensitive to consider-
ations of civil liberties. However, a recovery operation necessitated by for-
eign involvement would enjoy wide public support. Furthermore, such a
recovery operation would not be aimed at any particular racial class, but
at the broad class of those whose safety is genuinely in danger. What such
a recovery operation would entail is not entirely clear, but it is unlikely
to be more intrusive than the relocation of Japanese-Americans during
World War II. If there is foreign involvement and imminent danger of
a nuclear incident, it seems likely that, in view of its history, the Court
would uphold intrusive recovery actions.
b. Ordinary Crime
There would be overwhelming pressure to turn the country upside down
in the event of a successful theft of fissile material. The Supreme Court's
simple dictum that the courts must balance "the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails,""4 has led to differing views of what is
reasonable in times of criminal crisis.
In 1974, the San Francisco police detained and questioned blacks,
in the absence of specific grounds, during a city-wide search for
the perpetrators of the so-called "Zebra" murders. Federal District Judge
Zirpoli granted an injunction forbidding these activities, even though many
murders had occurred and it was known only that the suspect was black.55
Judge Zirpoli had looked to a case in Baltimore in 196656 where the police
had searched over 300 private dwellings occupied almost entirely by blacks,
without probable cause or warrants. They were searching for two blacks
believed to have killed one police officer and wounded another during a
liquor store robbery. In enjoining such searches, the court observed:
This case reveals a series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy
52 Id. at 216-17.
52 Id. at 223-24.
54 Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
55 Williams v. Alioto, Nos. C74-866, C74-867 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal dismissed as moot,
549 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1977).
be Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
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ever to come under the scrutiny of a federal court .... If denying
relief in these circumstances should be held a proper exercise of judicial
restraint, it would be difficult to envision any case justifying judicial
intervention. The parties seeking redress have committed no acts war-
ranting violation of the privacy of their homes; there has never been
any suspicion concerning them or their associations."1
On the other hand, a federal court in New York upheld the search
of a suspect's apartment without a warrant even in the absence of any
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme
Court."R The case is interesting because of certain similarities to a hypothetical
recovery operation for contraband fissile material. The day after four
major New York City buildings had been struck by explosions, the police
arrested a suspect in possession of dynamite bombs believed to be in-
tended for the destruction of army property. Shortly before the arrest, the
police had searched the apartment of a friend of the suspect, allegedly
to discover either other explosives or information about the location and
timing of other explosions. The court held the search lawful because "the
consequences feared [by the FBI] had to be considered in the atmosphere of
seven terrifying explosions which had recently occurred in the city of New
York." Of course, this case entailed the search of only one person's apart-
ment, but, nonetheless, the court justified an otherwise unreasonable search
by balancing it against the occurrence of "terrifying explosions."
At the crux of the recovery issue, if thefts of fissile nuclear material
are to be treated as ordinary crime, is the applicability of the warrant re-
quirement and its particularity requirements. If evidence is procured by a
means which violates either the warrant requirement or the particularity
requirement, it is not admissible in a criminal proceeding of any kind.
6
"
The applicability of the warrant requirement to recovery operations
is -not clear, because of the lack of precedent in the area of thefts of fissile
material. Of course, this absence of precedent necessitates a speculative
approach to predicting what judicial standards would be applied to a recovery
operation. The Supreme Court has found the warrant requirement appli-
cable to searches and inspections performed for public health and safety.
The essentially non-criminal nature of a health and safety inspection was
not found to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement: "It is surely
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when an individual is suspected of
criminal behavior." 1
57 Id. at 201-2.
58 United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
59 Id. at 832.
60See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
e1 Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. at 530.
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The warrant requirement, if the recovery operation is conducted as
a criminal investigation, will probably be applicable. There is little case law
which indicates that the judiciary would dispense with it in a search of this
nature, regardless of the scope, unless it is an emergency as discussed below.
The fourth amendment states that: "No Warrants shall issue, but upon
probably cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." ' This
mandate displays the constitutional framers' absolute opposition to "gen-
eral warrants" or "writs of assistance." The purpose of the fourth amend-
ment "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials. '0 3 General warrants are thought to vio-
late this tenet by leaving the decision to invade a person's privacy to the
untrammeled discretion of a police officer.
The Supreme Court historically held that the warrant must be par-
ticular enough to allow the officer, "with reasonable effort [to] ascertain
and identify the place intended.""4 In 1967, the Supreme Court announced
a test for the reasonableness of an inspection for health and safety pur-
poses." First, the purpose of the inspection program is to prevent the "de-
velopment of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety"; " '
second, the only test of the reasonableness of a search is to balance "the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails";' third,
under the balancing test, the public interest in abatement of dangerous
conditions justifies the issuance of warrants aimed at entire areas where
"it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable
results.""8
This has led some to conclude that the courts would be willing to
sacrifice the particularity requirement, to a degree, in order to maintain
some level of judicial control over the search.6" This may be the only
method available to the judiciary in the event of a massive, sweeping
search for stolen fissile nuclear material. It is somewhat doubtful that such
a search would be declared unlawful or be enjoined in light of the dangers
involved."'
62 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
-Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. at 528.
64 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
15 Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. at 523.
" Id. at 535.
1Tld. at 536-37.
eS Id.
e8 See Comment, Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L.
Rav. 367, 420 (1975).
"0 The Supreme Court has made it clear that domestic security surveillance programs were
overbroad relative to the dangers they sought to avert, but this attitude probably would not
extend to clear-cut cases of extreme emergency. See, e.g., United States v. United States
Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972).
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In absence of a legislative statement or foreign involvement, the re-
covery operation must be viewed as an ordinary criminal investigation.
Thus, it would be for the judiciary to accept or reject the loss of fourth
amendment rights as a trade-off against a possible nuclear explosion or
dispersal of toxic radiological material. It is difficult to imagine the courts
enjoining a recovery operation in light of the possible consequences.
c. Emergency Power
The Supreme Court has upheld the suppression of constitutional rights
in emergency situations. Emergency exceptions have been held constitu-
tional for seizure, without due process, of tubercular cattle and unwhole-
some food,"2 for the enforcement of the compulsory smallpox vaccination
program"s and health quarantine, ' for the collection of the internal revenue
of the United States," for protection against economic disaster of a bank
failure," and for protection of the public from misbranded drugs.7" The
Supreme Court has outlined requirements of an emergency situation which
would justify a suppression of constitutionally guaranteed rights: the
action must be "directly necessary to secure an important governmental or
general public interest"; there has to be a "special need for very prompt
action"; the state must keep "strict control over its monopoly of legitimate
force"; and the person initiating the seizure must be a government official
responsible for determining, under a narrowly drawn statute, that the
action was "necessary and justified in the particular instance." '' The first
requirement would be fulfilled in the event of a theft of fissile material. The
recovery of stolen fissile material is most definitely an important governmental
and general public interest. The second requirement would be satisfied
because there would be a "special need for very prompt action." Only
the third requirement of a narrowly drawn statute and a designated re-
sponsible official would be lacking in a recovery operation. One possible
solution to this problem would be so-called "emergency legislation," a
response to public necessity which has received some attention in the
courts over the years. In ruling on an exercise of eminent domain by the
legislature, a Connecticut court has stated that:
Public necessity . . . is that urgent, immediate public need arising
from existing conditions which, in the judgment of the legislature,
justifies a disturbance of private rights that otherwise might be legally
exempt from such interference. The term is, therefore, a relative one.
71 Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929).
T2 N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
73 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
74 Compagne Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. St. Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
T5 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1930).
1eFahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1946).
77 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1949),
7s Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
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It determines in each case that may arise the relation of the duty
implied in the broad grant of legislative power to promote by ap-
propriate action the interests of the commonwealth to the limitations
of that power established for the protection of private rights."9
And in 1939, a New York court suggested that "emergency legislation"
is an integral step in legislative progression in the tradition of the common
law, providing for the changing needs of an ever more complex society:
Almost every legal innovation has been the product of "emergency"-
a condition that deviates from antecedent experience and for which
the usual forms of law seem inadequate to serve the public order.
Such conditions or emergencies, step by step, gave stimulus to the
creations, to the new writs and to the new pleas of the common law
during all its vital development. The statutory "emergency" of the
last decade in this country has frequently been a legislative fiction, but
such fictions to provide treatment for new conditions are in the best
tradition of the common law. A declaration of emergency by a legis-
lative body under recent legislative practice is usually a recognition
that new conditions require new treatment under regulations that might
be and frequently were long continued by successive enactments from
time to time. It was inevitable that these new devices of legislative
action, having once been accepted as "emergency" legislation and hav-
ing met the test of experience would in time, and where successful
in practice, be accepted as common and legitimate fields of permanent
legislation."0
However, more recent cases have tended to limit the operation of
"emergency" legislation where civil liberties are jeopardized. In disallowing
the imposition of license fees for importation of oil required by presidential
proclamation without any procedural prerequisites, a federal court noted
that:
More fundamentally, this case raises a question about the way Gov-
ernment should operate when responding to crisis. Neither the term
"national security" nor "emergency" is a talisman, the thaumaturgic in-
vocation of which should, ipso facto, suspend the normal checks and bal-
ances on each branch of Government. Our laws were not established
merely to be followed only when times are tranquil. If our system is to
survive, we must respond to even the most difficult of problems in a
manner consistent with the limitations placed upon the Congress, the
President and the Courts by our Constitution and our laws."1
From this history, it is apparent that the courts would have great diffi-
culty in assessing legislative authorization for mass recovery operations.
The public interest in recovering stolen fissile material would have to
791n re Shelton St. Ry. Co., 69 Conn. 626, 38 A. 362, 363 (1897).
80 Noyes v. Erie & Wyo. Farmers Co-op Corp., 170 Misc. 42, 10 N.Y.S.2d 114, 121 (1939).
81 Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 518 F.2d 1051, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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be weighed against the invasion of constitutional rights which the oper-
ation entailed.
Warrantless searches outside of a legislative scheme are most often
justified through the emergency doctrine: instances when police action is
called for and time is of the essence. The scope of an emergency search
is limited by the extent of the emergency which initiated it. During an
emergency search, authorities have the right to seize any evidence in plain
view.
The emergency doctrine emerged in 1948 when the Supreme Court
held that under exceptional circumstances authorities may dispense with
the need for a warrant.8" The search in question must be shown to be ab-
solutely necessary. The timeliness of the search and the need to avoid delay
are very important since it is the immediate need to search which justifies
the exception to the warrant requirement.
There are five broad categories of circumstances when warrantless
emergency search is legal: (1) fire emergencies, (2) hot pursuit, (3) loss
or destruction of evidence, (4) report of noise or suspicious odor, and
(5) report of crime or injury. 3 Only hot pursuit and report of crime or
injury apply directly to a recovery operation.
The hot pursuit doctrine allows authorities to follow a fleeing felon into a
building which he has just entered. " This doctrine is somewhat limited in that
a warrantless search after the arrest can be made only for weapons used in
the crime or against authorities. The Supreme Court has further stated
that the warrant requirement does not require authorities to delay an in-
vestigation if delay would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of
others. Courts have rejected warrantless searches beyond that. For example,
the courts rejected the application of the hot pursuit doctrine when a de-
fendant was arrested in his house and the arresting authorities searched
his attic on the pretense of looking for snipers.85
Warrantless crime scene searches can be conducted only when there
is reason to believe that there may be loss or destruction of evidence."
There is no exception to the warrant requirement predicated on the serious-
ness of the crime. The courts have allowed authorities to make a "walk-
through" search of premises to check for victims or potentially dangerous
persons still present. When a person is reported mysteriously missing, war-
82 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 451.
83 See Gonzales, Investigative Stops in High Crime Areas, 7 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 1
(1980).
84Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
85 United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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rantless room-to-room searches of hotels and other business premises have
been allowed."
C. Direct Constitutional Impacts
1. The Fourth Amendment Concerns
The reasonableness of a search is the controlling factor in whether the
search is held legal or illegal. While the primary objective of a recovery
operation would be the recovery of the stolen fissile material, it would also
be highly desirable that once the contraband material has been recovered, it
should be admissible as evidence against those who stole it. The test for
reasonableness has been laid out by the Court: "Unfortunately there can
be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails.""8
With this test in hand, a two-pronged approach to the problem could
be taken. A recovery operation may present an unprecedented "need to
search" which would in itself render the search reasonable. The all-or-
nothing approach to the exclusion rule taken by the courts, which makes
any contraband found in a lawful search admissible regardless of its re-
lation to the reason for the search, may become outmoded because of the
presence of a potential or real need to search as great as the need to search
for stolen fissile material. Several commentators have suggested that if
evidence unrelated to the recovery operation were turned up (i.e., contra-
band which is not related to nuclear theft) it might be legislatively made
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. This legislative action would have
the effect of lessening "the invasion the search entails" by protecting "third-
party" interests.89 However, it would not eliminate the tremendous invasion
of privacy a recovery operation could present to third parties. But, it could
be forcefully argued that the "expectation of privacy" would be far less in
an emergency search for stolen fissile material since, presumably, most
people would favor its recovery and would, in fact, welcome measures aimed
at locating it.
The desirability of excluding evidence not related to the recovery
operation is great. The courts would not be forced to choose between finding
the search reasonable (allowing individuals innocent of nuclear theft, but
guilty of unrelated crimes, to be tried on the basis of a search conducted
for contraband nuclear materials) and finding it unreasonable (making
prosecution of the suspected thieves difficult because of the inadmissibility
of the evidence of their theft-the recovered nuclear material). The only
aState v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 518 P.2d 151 (1974).
88 Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. at 536-37.
89 See CoMMrrTE ON Crvm RiGHTs, LEoISIATuRE RESPONSE TO ZUCKER V. STANFORD DAILY,
35 RIc. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 415-417 (1980); Dyk, supra note
29, at 105; BARTON, supra note 48, at 23.
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precedent for finding evidence secured in a legal search inadmissible is in
cases where the evidence has been found in a manner inconsistent with
with the particularity of the search:
The scope of the search must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. In other words,
it is, and indeed for preservation of a free society must be, a consti-
tutional requirement that to be reasonable the search must be as limited
as possible commensurate with the performance of its functions.9"
Even though contraband other than fissile materials may be found,
the "scope" of the search may not have been violated, since a small parcel
of fissile material may be difficult to find and, therefore, a thorough search
may be required. Perhaps the courts will find that the fruits of such a
search must also be reasonably "tied to and justified by the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible." Of course, this suggestion amounts
to a drastic change in the current approach to search and seizure, but a
drastic change may be necessary. It is reasonable to suggest that such a
change in the rules of criminal evidence would better be initiated through
legislation than in the courts, especially since the post-event environment
may be one which would foster radicalism in the judicial response.
2. Due Process Concerns
Constitutional due process requires that no person be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
This constitutional requirement can be circumvented if certain conditions
exist. These conditions, outlined above,91 have been extended to cases where
there exists a compelling state interest, special reason for prompt action,
and statutory authority for the intrusion given to a designated official. 92 The
NRC lacks at present both the statutory authority and the designated official.
If the NRC were to take steps toward satisfying these requirements, a
more orderly recovery operation with fewer undesirable legal consequences
should result.
D. Potential Scenarios
The aspects of a recovery operation which may affect civil liberties are
distinct from other nuclear safeguards activities in two respects. First, they
may never be used. Those activities selected in a recovery operation exist
only as plans in the unlikely event of theft or loss of fissile material. Secondly,
they possess the greatest potential for altering our present understanding of
civil liberties. In the event of a successful theft, unprecedented activities
may be necessary to prevent great destruction. For these reasons, constant
reformulation of planned recovery activities through research and de-
90 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807 (Emphasis in original; citations omitted).
91 See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
92See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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velopment of search techniques should be pursued. If all nuclear material
could be absolutely and easily located at all times-through the use of
techniques such as radioactivity scans-wholly different and possibly less
onerous recovery techniques might be feasible. This article has also raised
the possibility of spiking radioactive material for purposes of increasing
detection capabilities.
Since response plans are not made public, it is important for us to
focus upon the most intrusive conceivable elements of a hypothetical oper-
ation in order to appreciate the potential impact of such a recovery operation.
Possible responses include area searches and perimeter searches, as well
searches of pedestrians and vehicles.
1. The General Legal Characteristics of a Search for Contraband
Fissile Material
a. Area Searches
If a quantity of contraband fissile material were known to be within
an area of only a few blocks, pressure to thoroughly search the dwellings
in that area would be tremendous. Barton, in addressing the problems pre-
sented by an area search, suggests that:
It is . . . likely that even in a nuclear emergency, such a search (or
an area warrant) would be struck down. Nevertheless, in airport search
cases, a perceived overwhelming necessity dictated a change in the
law. And public opinion would probably support such a change in
the law. If the courts were to expand the emergency exception to
permit area searches during nuclear emergency, the implication would
be much greater freedom for area searches in any riot or terrorist
blackmail situation. If, instead, the courts were to weaken the probable
cause or particularity requirements for the issuance of warrants, the
implication could be to expand general search powers enormously."
This statement fairly represents the doctrinal choice which would be pre-
sented to the courts if many dwellings were entered in an uncertain effort
to recover a missing quantity of fissile material. Declaring the search un-
lawful may trigger tort liability for officers conducting the search,' but
this problem is minimized by the Court's ruling that "good faith and prob-
able cause" are acceptable defenses in such cases.9"
In the absence of any further legislation or rule-making on recovery
operations, the courts' choices in dealing with a recovery process are limited
93 BARTON, supra note 48, at 24.
"Suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a federal tort action for illegal arrest and
search. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
95 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). On the general inadequacy of possible criminal and
tort liability as deterrents for police violations of constitutional rights, see W. LAFAvE, AmRRsT,
411-27 (1965).
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to: declaring the search unconstitutional and attempting to define what
circumstances or statutes might make a recovery search acceptable; ex-
panding the emergency exception in search and seizure requirements to
allow for warrantless searches in emergency situations involving a risk
as great as that in a nuclear incident; or fashioning a warrant which would
lessen both the probable cause requirement and particularity requirement
of present warrants.
Undesirable ramifications of operations for recovery of stolen fissile
materials could be lessened if the NRC were to establish guidelines on
how evidence should be treated and publicly designate a government official
to head the search. Of course, the search itself would still be onerous,
but there would be no impetus for the courts to rule on its validity if no
prosecutions were sought. If prosecutions of indicted thieves of recovered
fissile material were the only ones sought, the court would have to rule
on the admissibility of the contraband fissile material as evidence. Perhaps
the statutes protecting such materials could be amended to allow less
difficulty in prosecutions in the absence of the stolen material as evidence.
In any event, if many prosecutions were sought on the basis of contraband
seized during the search, but not related to the recovery operation, the
courts would almost certainly rule the search unconstitutional.
No questions are raised in this article concerning the forces that would
be involved in such a search nor the tactics that would be used. These
issues are not directly related to civil liberties but must, nonetheless, be
decided in advance of a recovery operation. The courts have shown a
clear preference for prior planning and accountability.
In the event of a widespread area search requiring entry into dwellings,
it may not be possible to fulfill the prior planning requirement. There are
two options if the courts were to accommodate this activity. The emergency
exception to the warrant requirement could be expanded to include a
nuclear materials recovery operation, or an area warrant could be judicially
granted relaxing both the particularity requirement and the probable cause
requirements. The implications of either option are far-reaching. If the
emergency exception were expanded, warrantless searches might be per-
mitted in other emergency situations which are potentially less dangerous
than a nuclear safeguards breach (i.e., riots, demonstrations). If the par-
ticularity and probable cause requirements were relaxed, a constitutional
requirement explicitly condemning such searches would be directly con-
travened. Either option requires a fundamental change in the law of search
and seizure which would have a direct impact on civil liberties.
b. Perimeter Searches
Since a thorough perimeter search can lessen the overall onerousness
of a recovery operation by allowing time for sensitive radiation detectors
Summer, 1981]
29
O'Brien: Contraband Nuclear Material
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAw REVIEW
to arrive, such a search is an alternative to an area search without mechanical
detectors. It may thus be advisable to plan recovery operations so as to
include a perimeter search. Here we presume that the civil liberties
impacts of a perimeter search would be less burdensome than those of an
immediate area search conducted without radiation detectors designed for
such searches. In order to isolate the area in which the stolen material is
believed to exist, authorities may have to order a sweeping search of auto-
mobiles and pedestrians.
If contraband fissile material were known to be within a certain area(e.g., a city block) a great incentive would exist to search all persons leav-
ing that area. Devices exist for this purpose. Handheld personnel monitors
can be used in the same way that handheld magnetometers are used to
search persons who activate the portal magnetometer at airports." Their
availability and exact sensitivity are classified as secret national security
information.
If an emergency were perceived, there might not be time to obtain
handheld detection devices. In that case, a "frisk" of all individuals de-
parting from the area suspected of containing contraband material would
be necessary.
"Stop and frisk" cases which have appeared before the Supreme Court
have held that the authority of a police officer to frisk without a warrant
is restricted to a search for weapons which may endanger the officer:
[T]here must be narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime.97
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged that "The
Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course
of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the
lives of others.""8
There is little doubt that the malevolent use of contraband fissile mate-
rial would "gravely endanger . . . the lives of others." The mere presence
of a person in an area known to contain contraband material may serve
as the functional equivalent of probable cause for a search. If so, the fact
that the person is not in his home and is mobile becomes important. The
"emergency" warrant exception can be based on the threat of loss of
9 6W. Kunz, Hand-held Personnel and Vehicle Monitor at 246 (report presented to the in-
stitute of Nuclear Materials Management at their annual meeting. at Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, June 18-20, .1975).
07 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27 (1968).
98 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
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evidence: "When there is probable cause to search and it is "impracticable"
• . . to get a search warrant, then a warrantless search may be reasonable."9
If the contraband material were known to be within a certain area,
it could be contained there only by means of a perimeter search. Radiation
detectors could be obtained in the resulting interim period between con-
tainment and search. It seems doubtful that the courts would hold a per-
sonal search at a perimeter station unreasonable, but they have made it
clear that the determination depends heavily on the circumstances of the
particular instance.
Case law has indicated that a physical search of pedestrians could be
justified by an extraordinary "need to search" in the event of theft or
loss of fissile material00 A search administered uniformly to all persons in
the controlled area would more likely be held lawful than one conducted
arbitrarily. The search would be more acceptable if its scope were restricted,
to as great a degree as possible, to the object sought. As an obvious ex-
ample, a body cavity search would certainly be unreasonable if the material
were in a form which must be kept in a container (i.e., Pu" in the liquid
nitrate form which is too large to conceal in a body cavity).
Vehicle searches can be conducted with a mechanical handheld de-
tector.0 1 The availability of these detectors to authorities conducting the
search is extremely important. Technologies for searching for contraband
material in vehicles at checkpoints are classified as secret national security
information and, therefore, cannot be discussed here.
By and large, the same doctrines applying to personal searches in a
perimeter search program would apply to vehicle searches. The Supreme
Court has intimated that a search of vehicles constitutes a lesser invasion
than a search of someone's home because an automobile may be searched:
"where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality . . . in which the warrant must be
sought."10 2 Since the need to secure the contraband nuclear material is great
and since a perimeter search will ultimately lessen the overall obtrusiveness
of the search by providing containment until mechanical detectors can be
obtained, vehicle perimeter search techniques seem less likely to be found
unreasonable.
As with pedestrian searches, a vehicle perimeter search is an alter-
native to an area search where there are no mechanical detectors yet avail-
able. The exception to the warrant requirement for automobile searches
99 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773 (1969).
10oSee, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 563 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S.
1021 (1977).
101 Kunz, supra note 96. "
102 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
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has already been established so that no fundamental change in case law
would be required. While this exception would broaden somewhat the
already relaxed probable cause requirement for vehicle searches, the civil
liberties implications of a search of vehicles exiting from a specific and
limited area do not seem terribly significant.
E. Conclusions
If a diversion or theft of fissile nuclear material did occur, it must be
assumed that drastic measures would be necessary to locate and recover
the contraband material. There is little discussion in the literature of the
specifics of such a search since most details remain classified. An operation
aimed at recovery would certainly involve at least kilogram quantities of
fissile material. Such amounts would probably be easy to conceal in such
a way as to shield them from detection over any appreciable distance.
Highly enriched uranium by itself has relatively low gamma and
neutron emission levels, making it essentially undetectable if shielded at
all. A search for unspiked HEU with radiation detectors would have to
include entry into areas normally not subject to searches, and would raise
the issue of the warrant requirement. For example, 30 kg of HEU could
be successfully hidden from detection by secreting it in a basement sump
well under one or two feet of water." 3 If HEU were spiked with either
a gamma or neutron spikant it would be more detectable, but still could
be shielded, especially if the perpetrator had taken speedy measures to de-
posit the contraband HEU in a shielded holding place.
Th 28 would probably be the most desirable gamma spikant because
of its high energy emissions. But gamma spikants suffer from one major
drawback. Detectors moving from location to location seeking extraneous
gamma radiation will register significant variations in background levels and,
therefore, long count intervals and accurate background data must be
available. This is a sizable problem since both conditions are difficult to
meet, particularly in the context of an expeditious search. In any event,
to be detectable for the purposes of location, HEU may require the addi-
tion of a very high-energy gamma source, perhaps at lethal spiking levels.
Even then, however, effective shielding is certainly possible.
For a neutron spikant, the emission energy is not as important as
the rate of emission. Even with a high count rate, concrete or water is a
very effective shield. In fact, placing the contraband fissile material at the
bottom of a swimming pool or a small lake would make its neutron emissions
virtually impossible to detect.
Uranium23 3 reactor fuels contain some U2 82 which will generate radio-
isotopes producing very high-energy gamma radiation. The high-energy
103 This statement can be verified by simple, well-known physical calculations.
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emission from U2 3 fuel will actually approximate lethal spiking, making
shielding necessary to prevent lethal exposures. Given that the material
must be shielded anyway, it is reasonable to assume that additional shield-
ing will render the contraband U"I' undetectable by radiation detectors.
Plutonium emits both gamma radiation and neutrons, each of which
is detectable with radiation detectors. Neither is of sufficient strength to
allow detection over any distance if simple shielding measures have been
taken. Pu could be spiked to enhance gamma or neutron emissions, but in
either case simple water or concrete shielding could interdict emissions to
render the contraband Pu unobservable at long distances.
Spiking of HEU and Pu could significantly increase the likelihood of
locating contraband materials with mechanical devices. U2 33 is already suffi-
ciently radioactive to make the addition of a spikant superfluous. How-
ever, any emissions used for detection could be easily shielded. The search
for contraband material would have to be extended into dwellings and,
most probably, onto private property. The legal requirement of a search
warrant describing with particularity the premises to be searched would be
impossible to meet under such circumstances. Responding to an emergency
of such potential dimensions as could be created by a theft of fissile material
will require not only technological readiness but also some fundamental
changes in our current understanding of the law and search and seizure.
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